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I. INTRODUCTION

There is a long-standing practice of attorneys accepting positions as
corporate directors, roles that to a large degree are indicative of professional
accomplishment. Accepting a position on a corporation's board of directors
is enticing for lawyers since they may enjoy the opportunity to influence
corporate decisions in the business arena. Additionally, lawyers are prime
candidates for directorships because they are uniquely qualified to assess
business issues from a legal standpoint. In fact, it is common practice both in
the past and today for attorneys to assume the dual role of both attorney and
director.1 Corporate clients continuously request that lawyers not only sit on
the board of directors but also serve the corporation as its attorney.' However,
assuming the dual role of both lawyer and director undoubtedly raises ethical
concerns. This article examines the dual role of attorney-director, and the
ethical dilemmas that inevitably result from the practice.

LLM. in Taxation Candidate, May 2001, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law;
J.D. cum laude, May 2000, University of Miami School of Law; B.S.F.S. 1997, Georgetown University.
I
See Robert T. Swaine, Impact of Big Business on the Profession: An Answer to Critics of the
Modem Bar, 35 A.B.A.J. 89, 170 (1949). In this early but important piece, Swaine urged a change in ethical
canons prohibiting lawyers from serving on the boards of a client corporation, but noted that the practice
is probably too widespread to effectuate a realistic change in policy. Id.
2
See Amy Stevens, LawyersAre Finding CorporateBoardSeats More Uncomfortable,WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 1993, at lI(observing that in 1993, 78 of the largest 250 industrial companies had an attorney
on their board).
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II. THE GOVERNING RULES
Although it is common practice for attorneys to become directors for their
client corporations, the law of professional responsibility has not squarely
addressed the issue. The American Bar Association's ("ABA") Model Rules
of ProfessionalConduct offers only minimal guidance on the topic. Comment
14 to the general rule governing conflict of interest provides:
A lawyer for a corporation or other organization who is also a member
of its board of directors should determine whether the responsibilities
of the two roles might conflict. The lawyer may be called on to advise
the corporation in matters involving actions of the directors.
Consideration should be given to the frequency with which such
situations arise, the potential intensity of the conflict, the effect of the
lawyer's resignation from the board and the possibility of the
corporation's obtaining legal advice from another lawyer in such
situations. If there is material risk that the dual role will compromise
the lawyer's independence of professional judgment, the lawyer
should not serve as director.3
As such, the Rules provide an attorney with substantial latitude'in assuming
the dual role of lawyer and director by allowing her to make a determination
about whether serving in the dual capacity could potentially conflict.
Nonetheless, comment 14 specifically constricts this lenient standard by
pronouncing that the lawyer should not serve as director if there is a material
risk that wearing both hats will affect the lawyer's independent judgment.4
Common law doctrine dictates that so long as a director or officer acts
rationally on an informed basis and in the interests of the corporation, he shall5
not be held personally liable even if the decision produces a disastrous result.

3
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 14 (1999). In addition, the ABA's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility is completely silent on the attorney-director dual role issue. See

generallyMODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
4
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 14 (1999). It should be noted that while

Comments add guidance to the Rules, they are not obligatory in nature. See id. Scope at 13. Moreover, the
Rules are not exhaustive of the moral considerations lawyers might face. See id. Scope at 14.
This doctrine is typically referred to as the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Fund,
Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973) The court explained:
[tlhe business judgment rules has been expressed in a variety of ways but it may be
stated that the directors and officers of a corporation will not be held liable for errors
or mistakes in judgment, pertaining to law or fact, when they have acted on a matter
calling for the exercise of their judgment or discretion, when they have used such
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A lawyer-director's independent business judgment will conceivably be
compromised if the lawyer advocates a course of action that might generate
legal work for the lawyer or the lawyer's firm. Even though the decision might
be a business decision, there is still a degree of self-interest if the lawyer stands
to benefit financially.
The lack of guidance from the ABA has since been remedied by the
issuance of ABA Formal Opinion 410, which has clarified the issue,
addressing the propriety of an attorney serving on the board of directors of a
client corporation.' This article takes ABA Formal Opinion 410 into
consideration and analyzes the issues and complexities involved in the dual
role.
II. DEFINING THE CLIENT

ABA Model Rule 1.7 is patently brought into question when an attorney
serves on the board of directors of a client corporation. Model Rule 1.7 states
in part, "[a] lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that
client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another
client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests."7 This rule is
circumscribed by providing that such representation shall be allowed if the
client consents after consultation or the lawyer reasonably believes the
representation will not be affected adversely by the conflict.'
Perhaps the singular reason lawyers believe their representation will not
be adversely affected by the dual role is because of the corporate structure
itself. The ABA Model Rules are explicit in noting that a corporation's
attorney represents the entity itself, not the shareholders, directors, or agents
of the business.9 Although an organization can only conduct affairs through
the actions of its constituents,' 0 the lawyer's retention by an entity rather than
a person has a natural distancing effect that may carry a deflection of
responsibility which is typically associated in organizational settngsY The

judgment and have so acted in good faith.
Id. at 518.
7

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 410 (1998).
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7(b) (1999) (emphasis added).

'

See id.

See id Rule 1.13(a) (stating that "[a] lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents
the organization acting through its duly authorized constituents."). Additionally, constituents of an
9

organizational client are not clients of the lawyer. See id. at cmt 3. See also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L

RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1980) (promulgating the lawyer's allegiance to the business entity rather than its
agents).
to
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 1(1999).
"

See Deborah L Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, in THE LEGAL PROFESSION:
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very nature of corporations is of an impersonal character that often causes
certain fragmentation of moral responsibility. 2 Moreover, if the interests of
the corporation's constituents diverge, the lawyer's role is complicated since
he must act in the interest of an artificial being-the corporate entity, and not
in the interest of the constituents.13 For example, if a corporate lawyer were
to discover that an officer is engaged is antitrust violations, the lawyer has a
duty to bring it up the corporate ladder because the duty to the corporation
exceeds the duty to the officer. Thus, even where the attorney is not a director
or officer of the client corporation, there are significant difficulties in corporate
representation.
Indeed, some opponents of attorneys serving in this dual capacity find that
the roles can never be properly separated. 4 Moreover, the roles of lawyer and
director are not identical, and insofar as one role influences, even remotely, the
other, there is a loss of professionalism. 5 For instance, a director owes a
fiduciary duty of loyalty to the company and its stockholders, while the
attorney's fiduciary duty is owed exclusively to the company itself. 7 At the
point where the lawyer-director's professionalism is compromised, both roles
remain inadequately fulfilled.'8 The Restatement (Third) on the Law
Governing Lawyers"9 takes an identical stance:
Simultaneous service as corporate lawyer and corporate director or
officer is not forbidden by this Section, [though] when the obligations
or personal interests as director are materially adverse to those of the
lawyer as corporate counsel, the lawyer may not continue to serve as

RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION 279, 280 (Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Deborah L Rhode eds., 3d ed.
1994).
12

See id

13

See George D. Reycraft, Conflicts of Interest and Effective Representation: The Dilemma of
Corporate Counsel, 39 HAS=INGS LJ. 605,609 (1988); see also Cottonwood Estates, Inc. v. Paradise
Builders, Inc. 624 P.2d 296, 303 (Ariz. 1981) (finding that a lawyer's corporate ministerial duties conflicted
with his professional duty to exercise independent judgment for his client).
14
See Wilton S. Sogg & Michael L Solomon, The Changinj Role of the Attorney with Respect to
the Corporation, 35 CLEV. ST. L REV. 147, 154 (1987) (opining that since there is already substantial
confusion in determining who is the client of the corporate attorney, it would be imprudent to have the

attorney serve as the director of the client).
is

i

See id.
See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993).
See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1999).
See Sogg & Solomon, supra note 14, at 154.

19

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAwYERs

14
17

(Proposed Final Draft 1996).
Persuasive in nature, the Restatement serves more as a guideline, and in some instances, proposals of how
the law should be, than binding authority.
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corporate counsel without the informed consent of the corporate
client.'
It would appear that the prevailing view is that, despite the ubiquitous,
obvious difficulties in representing a corporation, the corporate lawyer has
sufficient freedom in deciding whether to accept a position on a corporation's
board of directors.
IV. INCREASED DUTY OF CARE

Any attorney serving as director may be held to a higher standard of care
due to his specialized knowledge. 2' A district court in New York went so far
as to hold a lawyer-director liable as an inside director due to the attorney's
misleading registration statement under section 11 of the Securities Act of
1933.22 The well-known case of Escon v. BarChrisConstruction Corporation
came to a similar result, that anyone with special expertise has an obligation
to the corporation that directors without similar expertise would not be
expected to recognize.23
The attorney-director's standard of care will therefore be raised (to that of
the ordinary inside-director).2
Therefore, the dual role may expose the
lawyer, and his law firm, to potential liability that could easily be averted if the
directorship were declined. 25 Fees garnered from more legal work resulting
from the dual relationship, however, largely offset the potential liability.
V. CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

One step an attorney should always take before she accepts a position on
a corporate board is informing the client of the applicable ethical rules and
delineating her potentially conflicting role. Naturally, this explanation should
take place before the lawyer accepts the position in order for the corporate
client to have an opportunity to object if it believes the lawyer serving in a
dual capacity may hinder its interests. This is also a necessary precaution in

20
21

Id. at § 216cmt.d.
See Report of Committee on CorporateLaws: Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct,

30 BUS. LAW. 501,506 (1974).
n
See Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 550 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
2
See generally,Escott v. BaChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
24
See William E. Knepper, Liability of Lawyer-Directors,40 OHIO ST. L.J. 341,346 (1979).
2

See 1 WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILrTY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND

DIRECTORS § 1-10, at 26 (6th ed. 1998).
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ensuring that other directors and managers know the risks involved of having
a lawyer serve on their board.'
While it is recommended that a lawyer address any possible conflicts of
interest with the client before representation begins, this is not required by the
Model Rules themselves.27 The escape hatch is the language that allows
representation to continue, even without informing the client of potential risks,
if the lawyer thinks his representation will not be "materially limited." 2
Notwithstanding this language, a lawyer should always cover his tracks by
avoiding any entanglements in possible ethical dilemmas. Clearly, the safer
route is to consult with the client beforehand, overtly discuss the situation, and
obtain written waiver from the client, since a lawyer's personal determination
in self-policing might not be an adequate defense to a disciplinary
proceeding's determination of what could reasonably "materially limit"
representation. Because the standard is quite subjective, informing the client
should be the preferred route. One prudent commentator recommends
'
"[leaning] over backwards to avoid the appearance of impropriety."2
Although the language in Comment 14 to Model Rule 1.7 and the ensuing
formal opinion issued by the ABA may be lenient, Model Rule 1.7 itself may
forbid the dual practice in various circumstances 3 0
An attorney's
representation becomes "materially limited" whenever his ethical
responsibilities under the appropriate rules governing attorney conduct deviate
from his fiduciary obligations as director.3 ' As an agent of the corporation,
any director has a duty of loyalty to the corporation itself and therefore, the
shareholders as well. If an attorney's representation violates this duty of
loyalty, due to a course of action that is self-interested, it represents a conflict
of interest since the lawyer's responsibilities to the shareholders are
compromised. 2
In actuality, however, such a circumstance is extremely rare. The attorney
is given the latitude to keep both positions if she reasonably believes the

26

See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'l Responsibility, Formal Op. 410 (1998); see also Cornelia

W. Honchar, Service on a Board of Directors Can Pose Many Conflicts, C1. DAILY L BULL., May 12,
1998, at 6.
27
See generally MODEL RuLEs op PROF'L CoNr)ucT Rule 1.7 (1999).
29

William Schwarz, Law Firm Partnership and Benefits Report (August 1998) (unpublished report,

on file with author). Mr. Schwarz is a partner at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft who serves a director for

companies including Viacom International, Inc.
30
See MODEL RULES Ot PROF'L CONDucT R. 1.7(b) (1999) (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not
represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited ..... ).
31
See Craig C. Albert, The Lawyer-Director: An Oxymoron?, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICs 413, 431
(1996).
n

See id
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representation will not be materially impeded. Attorneys clearly enjoy the
benefits of having broad discretion in a potentially dangerous realm. Although
the risks are relatively low, the upshot of not removing oneself from a conflict
of interest situation could be devastating."
The dearth of case law on the topic is most likely attributable to the
frequency of settlement once the threat of litigation arises. Nonetheless,
lessons can be drawn from lawyer-director conflicts that have received
significant publicity. In 1994, the stockholders of Weirton Steel Corporation
forced the resignation of a well-respected attorney, Harvey Sperry, who had
served as a director for ten years.34 Sperry's firm was pulling in over $1
million in legal business per year exclusively from Weirton Steel, but the firm
also represented nearly two dozen rival steel makers.35 The President of
Weirton' s Steel Employee Shareholders' Association told reporters, "[i]f we're
going to have an independent director, we want one who's really
independent. ' 36 This represents precisely the sort of conflict of interest that
can arise from an attorney-director position. It would be nearly impossible for
someone in Perry's position to keep the best interests of Weirton Steel in mind
when his firm was directly interested in the performance of rival steel
companies. It is quite likely that both the duty as attorney and as director
could be hindered in this sort of situation.
Also receiving noteworthy publicity was the report of Hillary Rodham
Clinton using her board influence at TCBY Enterprises, Inc. to help her thenpartners at the Rose Law Firm in Little Rock to gamer more than $1.2 million
of the company's legal business in 1991 to 1992.37 It should be considered
improper for a lawyer to use her position as director to channel business for
her law firm. Doing so certainly takes away the essential element of serving
the company, since the director's personal financial interest is clearly
paramount. Any business decision that might involve potential litigation or
needing the firm's services for any reason would cause a serious conflict of
interest for the director. As one commentator states, "[i]f you have a selfinterest, then, by necessity, you can't 8be looking after shareholder interests
3
with the proper degree of objectivity.

3
34

See generally id. (discussing possible sanctions in this area).
See Gail D. Cox, For Lawyers, Lure ofthe Boardroom Has Its Perils, NAT'L LJ., July, 1, 1996,

atBi.
35
36

37

See id
Id.
See id.
fit (quoting Melvyn I. Weiss, a specialist in stockholder derivative suits).
I9
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V1. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
Another concern arising from serving as both lawyer and director is the
possibility of surrendering information that might otherwise be privileged.
Lawyers serving concurrently as directors of their client corporations run the
risk of courts taking an all or nothing approach, finding the lawyer to be
primarily a lawyer or businessperson, and treating communications
accordingly. Therefore, it would be unethical if attorneys cried privilege when
acting in the capacity of a director. The dual role should not serve as a clever
way to expand the basic definition of attorney-client privilege.39 This privilege
is designed to run solely between the client and his attorney, and is the
privilege of the client, not counsel. To that end, it would be unfair if this
privilege were extended by counsel to protect information that would not
otherwise be protected.
The harsh reality of serving in the dual role is that communications
intended to be purely legal advice may be treated as business advice and lose
privileged status. Moreover, a lawyer's position as a director can often be
attributed to his legal background rather than his business sense. Thus, one
might question whether all of the lawyer-director's advice should be treated
as legal advice. However, when sitting on a board, the lawyer's role as a
decision-maker does not limit him to the giving of advice. There is also a
component of observation of whatever topic is brought before the board.
Certainly, all discussions with an attorney-director present should not benefit
from privilege. The dilemma becomes much more problematic in complex
business issues where legal issues are inherently implicated. It is nearly
impossible to draw the line and decipher when the attorney is acting as lawyer,
and when he is acting as director. The primary reason why this line is difficult
to draw is because nearly all the attorney-director's business advice takes his
legal expertise into consideration.
Thus, the attorney clarifying certain communications as legal advice
should be paramount. It will be difficult for the business entity to later prove
that any particular communication occurred during a consultation with the
lawyer-director for legal advice,' so a clarification by the attorney should be

39

See JOHN H. WIGMORE, A STUDENTS' TEXTBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE, 392-93 (The

Foundation Press, Inc. 1935). According to Wigmore, the attorney-client privilege arises when legal advice
is sought from a professional lawyer who is acting in that capacity at the time. Furthermore, in order to be
protected, the communication must be made in confidence and is permanently protected from disclosure
unless waived by the client. See id.
4
See Carolyn T. Thurston, Corporate Counsel on the Board ofDirectors: An Overview, 10 CUMB.
L REv. 791,797 (1980).
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a basic precaution in case the confidentiality of the communication is
questioned. Nonetheless, there is a presumption that communication between
a client and her attorney be treated as legal advice.4" It remains to be seen
whether this presumption would attach to the unique case of an attorneydirector where both roles clearly overlap. Due to the precarious nature of the
relationship, however, it is entirely possible that the business entity might bear
the burden of convincing the court that the director was consulted as a lawyer
rather than a director.42
An older case that vividly illustrates the difficulties of the dual role is
United States v. Vehicular Parking,Ltd.43 Vehicular Parking involved an
antitrust claim brought by the government against a corporation contending
that various communications with its attorney-director were privileged and
therefore inadmissible at trial. The court determined that the blending of the
dual role did not automatically allow the defendant to claim privilege, and in
fact regarded several of the communications as basic business parlance."
Vehicular Parking was seen as accepting most communications from the
lawyer-director as business advice rather than legal advice. Additionally, there
were other circumstances working against the attorney-director in this
situation. Primarily, the attorney-director's law office was established as the
principal place of business for the corporation, and he commonly acted as
business manager and agent for Vehicular Parking.45 Clearly, the level of
involvement the attorney-director had in the business affairs of the company
led to presumption that the he was acting in his business capacity as director.
Another way in which the attorney-client privilege may be compromised
is any communication between the lawyer-director and the board in a
shareholder derivative suit. The fiduciary obligations of the lawyer-director
and the corporation to the shareholders will most likely override the privilege
afforded between attorney and client.' The court in Garnerv. Wolfinbarger,47
a stockholder derivative case, denied a claim of attorney-client privilege for a
lawyer-director.48 Reasoning that the privilege exists for the benefit of the

41
See, e.g., Sogg & Solomon, supra note 14, at 155-56; see also Diversified Indus., Inc. v.
Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that there is a prima facie presumption that communication
between client and attorney is for the sake of legal advice).
42

See Thurston, supra note 40, at 811.

52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1949).
See id.at753. The court, pointing out several exhibits, boldly stated "(tihis is more than attorneytalk. It is big-as well as basic-business diction." Id
45
See id
"
See Sogg & Solomon, supra note 14, at 156; see also Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361,
368 (D. Del. 1975).
47
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970).
48
See id. at 1100-01.
43
4
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client and not the attorney, the court found the assertion of privilege
contradictory since the plaintiffs (as shareholders) are one entity with the
corporation and the interests should be mutual.49 Therefore, a court in all
likelihood will not honor any claim that a particular communication is
privileged to the board but not the shareholders or the corporate entity itself.
This decision does not cut against Model Rule 1.13, since the entity of the
corporation itself is more represented by its shareholders than by its
agents-the directors and officers."
VII. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the arrangement of lawyers serving on the board of client
corporations is such a commonplace phenomenon that the notion of banning
the practice as unethical would come across as rather jarring and possibly
highhanded. The long tradition of accepting the dual role has institutionalized
the practice as a convenient and effective way for attorneys to increase both
personal profits and influence. Furthermore, clients enjoy the accessibility of
having a legal expert in a decision-making capacity. However, simply because
the practice is commonplace should not give attorneys a carte blanche to take
advantage of an arrangement which teeters on the edge of violating the rules
but which has not been forbidden outright by the ABA.
The very nature of the dual role is inherently contradictory. Absolute
objectivity, while ideal, is unlikely to result from a situation where the attorney
knows her decisions will have an effect on her (or her firm's) welfare. Even
more disconcerting is the weak standard set by the ABA, essentially calling on
the attorneys themselves to determine whether the representation will be
hindered.5 1 This lenient self-policing leaves too much room for abuse.
Prohibiting the practice outright would prove to be wildly unpopular, but
the ABA should consider adding teeth to their opinion. Primarily, it is
paramount that the discretion be taken out of the hands of the attorney himself,
and given to the client after an informed consultation. The more lenient the
standard, the higher the probability for abuse, and the standards of selfpolicing are lenient indeed.
Below is a proposed rewording of Comment 14 to Model Rule 1.7:
[14] A lawyer serving as counsel for a corporation or other
organizationwho is also a member of its board of directions is in a

49

so
51

See id.
See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text
See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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position where there is an ever-present possibility of conflict of
interests. Regardless of the frequency with which such conflicting
situations may arise and the potential intensity of the conflict, the
lawyer is requiredto consult with the client before accepting the dual
role. Consultation shall include discussion of the contradictory
nature of the position and how such conflicts might affect
representation. It is recommended that consultation of this kind be
reduced to writing and signed by both attorney and client. If there is
material risk, to the attorney or client, that the dual role will
compromise the lawyer's independence of professionaljudgment or
the client's interests, the lawyer shall not serve as director.
The requirement of consultation would at least put clients on notice that
the dual role is somewhat irregular and conflicts may arise which mandate
withdrawal as counsel pursuant to Model Rule 1.16.52 Furthermore, if clients
were always given the opportunity to object with full knowledge of the
potential conflicts, the number of attorney-directors would likely decline as
clients became more wary. Nonetheless, many business entities would still
want to keep a lawyer on their board to infuse legal discussion into making
business decisions, and since the lawyer is relied upon to simplify and make
judgments on the arcane and otherwise inaccessible nature of the law.53
Otherwise, the practice of having an attorney present during all board meetings
but not on the actual board itself may be a viable alternative.
Just as important as informing the client of a potential conflict of interest
is the need for the attorney to fulfill his duties of care and loyalty to the
client.' If there is a genuine chance that a conflict of interest due to the dual
role of attorney and director would hinder the representation of the client,
representation should not continue unless the client explicitly waives objection
to the arrangement.
Beyond the simple conflict of interest, the attorney should also be aware
of the possibility of a higher standard of care once accepting the dual role. In
a society as litigious as ours, concerns of personal liability for malpractice
should not be ignored. The fiduciary roles as both attorney and director expose
accountability to a large pool of potential plaintiffs. 55 Moreover, the dual

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (1999).
See Robert A. Kagan and Robert E. Rosen, Symposium on the Law Firm as a Social Institution:
On the Social Significance ofLarge Law Firm Practice, 37 STAN. L REv. 399, 406 (1985).
54
See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Rule 1.7 cmt. 1 (1999).
55
See Albert, supra note 31, at 452.
52
53
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a variety of legal theories with which to attack the
nature allows plaintiffs
56
lawyer-director.
Lastly, the attorney-director need be especially careful in safeguarding the
attorney-client privilege. While general business rhetoric will not be protected
by the privilege, the client is entitled to a privilege, at least in some form. It
therefore falls upon the shoulders of the attorney to ensure that the necessary
attorney-client privilege is protected. Clearly, the line between business
advice and legal advice may become skewed, but a clarification that a certain
communication is purely legal advice may serve to protect the privilege should
it be questioned in later proceedings.
Ultimately, the ABA has established a broad standard that is easily
followed-self-policing. By giving the attorney rather than the client the
discretion, the phenomenon of the attorney-director will continue to flourish.
Nonetheless, due to the inherent proclivity of the dual role leading to conflicts
of interest, wearing the hats of both counsel and director remains somewhat
precarious, and a prudent attorney will accept the dual arrangement cautiously.
Given the widespread nature of the practice, though, a red flag should go up
whenever self-policing is simply replaced by self-serving.

"

See id at 453.

